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We study how people react to small probability events with large negative consequences using 
the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic as a natural experiment. Our analysis is based on a 
unique administrative data set with anonymized monthly expenditures at the individual level. We 
find that older consumers reduced their spending by more than younger consumers in a way that 
mirrors the age dependency in COVID-19 case-fatality rates. This differential expenditure 
reduction is much more prominent for high-contact goods than for low-contact goods and more 
pronounced in periods with high COVID-19 cases. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that people react to the risk of contracting COVID-19 in a way that is consistent with a canonical 
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1 Introduction
A central question in economics is: how do people respond to risk? The answer to
this question has fundamental implications for asset pricing, as well as many other areas
of economics. One prominent explanation of the equity premium relies critically on people
responding rationally to small probability events that have large consequences (see e.g.
Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), and Nakamura et al. (2013)). The way in which people re-
act to small probability events is an important issue in the literature on prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky (2013)).
By construction, it is difficult to gather a substantial amount of data on rare events.
The outbreak of a COVID-19 epidemic provides a natural experiment for how people react
to small probability events with large negative consequences–dying from COVID-19.
The probability of dying from COVID-19 is low for young people, rising with age
for people older than 50 (see e.g. Dowd et al. (2020)). People of all ages can reduce the
probability of becoming infected by cutting expenditures on goods and services that require
social contact (e.g., sports events and restaurant meals).
We study how younger and older people changed the level and composition of their
consumption expenditures in response to changes over time in the risk of infection. In
addition, we compare the expenditure behavior of people with and without comorbidities.
Our empirical work relies on a unique administrative data set from Portugal that in-
cludes anonymized monthly data on individual itemized consumer expenditures. The sam-
ple covers the period from January 2018 to May 2020. The data include the age, income
bracket, and gender of all people in the sample, as well as the education and occupation
of a subset of these people. In general, people might reduce consumption in response to
the epidemic for two reasons. First, they either lost their jobs or are worried about losing
their jobs because of the COVID-19 recession. Second, they want to reduce the risk of
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infection. Our analysis focuses on public servants’ consumption behavior. Their income
is likely to have been relatively unaffected by the crisis. So, their consumption behavior
should primarily reflect the influence of infection risk.
In our data, older consumers reduce their spending by more than younger consumers in
a way that mirrors the age dependency in COVID-19 case fatality rates. This differential
spending reduction is much larger for high-contact goods than for low-contact goods and
it is more pronounced in periods with a high risk of infection.
Our key empirical results are resilient to a variety of robustness checks. These checks
include controlling for comorbidity (pre-existing health conditions that increase the proba-
bility of dying from COVID-19), allowing for age-cohort-specific seasonal effects and income
trends, and using our empirical approach to study the behavior of retirees, another group
whose income is likely to have remained relatively stable during the epidemic.
We compare our empirical results with the predictions of a canonical model of risk-
taking behavior in which people have recursive preferences of the type considered by Kreps
and Porteus (1978), Weil (1989), and Epstein and Zin (1991). In this model, the probability
of getting infected depends on consumption activities and the probability of dying once
infected increases with age. We find that this canonical model accounts well for the way
in which people of different ages responded to the COVID-19 shock.
Both our empirical and model-based results are surprising in light of a large literature
that highlights the difficulties that people have in assessing and responding to low prob-
ability events (see, e.g. Slovic (2000) and Sunstein (2003)). Of course, it is possible that
people were particularly aware of the risks associated with COVID-19 because of all the
media attention devoted to the epidemic.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data set. Section 3 contains
our empirical results. Section 4 describes our model. Section 5 compares our empirical
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estimates with the implications of our model. We conclude in section 6.
2 Data
The data, obtained from Statistics Portugal (the national statistical authority), covers
the period from January 2018 to May 2020. Our dataset includes anonymized data for five
hundred thousand Portuguese randomly sampled from a total of 6.3 million people who
meet two criteria. First, they were at least 20 years old in 2020. Second, they filed income
taxes as Portuguese residents in 2017.
The data set includes the age, income bracket, and gender of everyone in the sample
as well as the education and occupation, in 2017, for a subset of the people in the sample.
For every person in our sample, we construct total monthly consumption expenditures
as well as expenditures on high- and low-contact goods and services. The latter variables
are constructed using a classification of industries into high and low contact (see Tables 8
and 9 in the appendix A.1 for details). High-contact industries include, for example, Food
and Beverage Service Activities. Low-contact industries include, for example, Legal and
Accounting Services. We also compute individual expenditures on pharmaceutical drugs,
which we use as a proxy for comorbidity.
We construct nominal consumption expenditure data using the electronic receipts that
firms provide to the tax authority as part of their value-added tax (VAT) reporting. Each
receipt can be matched to a particular person because it contains the person’s anonymized
fiscal number.1
Portuguese consumers have three incentives to include their fiscal number in their ex-
penditure receipts. First, they can then deduct from their income taxes, up to a limit,
1Our dataset does not include information on rent expenditures, mortgage, and other personal loan
payments subject to taxes other than VAT.
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expenditures on health, education, lodging, nursing homes, and general-household expen-
ditures. Second, the government rebates to consumers 15 percent of the VAT from docu-
mented expenditures on public transportation passes, lodging, restaurants, and automobile
and motorcycle shops. Third, for every ten euros of reported spending, consumers receive
a coupon for a lottery in which the prize is a government bond with a face value of either
35 or 50 thousand euros.
A person who does not have any receipts associated with their fiscal number in a given
month is excluded from the dataset in that month. We also removed from the sample
21,814 persons who in 2017 were unemployed or inactive. These people are unlikely to pay
taxes and so have less of an incentive to include their fiscal number in receipts. Finally,
we dropped from the sample all persons older than 80 because their expenditure patterns
suggest that many of them live in nursing homes. The resulting dataset contains 421,337
persons and 12,218,773 person-month observations that were aggregated over 97,363,250
buyer-seller pairs.
We identify two groups in our sample whose incomes are likely to have been relatively
unaffected by the COVID-19 recession: public servants (58,598 people) and retirees (93,839
people). 2
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for monthly expenses net of VAT. For public
servants, average per capita monthly expenditure on consumption goods and services is
673.9 euros, of which 307.3 euros is spent on high-contact goods and services and 26.1
euros on pharmaceutical items. Interestingly, these expenditures are roughly similar for
the overall sample: average per capita monthly expenditure on consumption goods and
services is 618.5 euros, of which 268.5 euros is spent on high-contact goods and services
and 18.2 euros on pharmaceutical drugs. Retirees have lower levels of overall expenditure.
2These groups overlap because we did not exclude retirees from the population of public servants.
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They spend, on average, 428.4 euros on consumption goods and services, of which 204
euros is spent on high-contact goods and services and 24.6 euros on pharmaceutical items.
Table 2 reports the same statistics as Table 1 broken down by age and income group.
As explained in section 3.1, we group people according to their ages so that they have a
similar risk of death from COVID-19. Our estimates of this risk are based on the statistics
reported by the Portuguese health authority (DGS). Income groups are based on the 2017
income-tax brackets used by Portugal’s Internal Revenue Service (IRS).3
3 Empirical results
This section is divided into two parts. In the first subsection, we provide a brief overview
of the course of the epidemic in Portugal and the containment measures introduced by the
government. We also discuss COVID-19 case-fatality rates by age and the evolution of
per capita consumption expenditures in our sample. In the second subsection, we present
formal econometric results of how the consumption expenditures of people with different
ages and comorbidity conditions reacted to the COVID-19 shock.
3.1 The epidemic in Portugal
Figure 1 depicts the weekly time series of infected people and COVID-19 deaths in
Portugal. For convenience, we refer to March, April and May of 2020 as the epidemic
months. Consistent with the facts documented by Atkeson, Kopecky and Zha (2020) for
a cross section of countries, the growth rate of deaths from COVID-19 fell from initially
high values to substantially lower levels.
The timeline of containment measures implemented by the Portuguese government is
as follows. On March 18, 2020, the government declared a state of emergency, restricting
3See the official website of the Portuguese IRS for additional details on income-tax brackets for 2017
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movement between municipalities, closing all airports to civil transportation, and imposing
border controls. On May 2, the government ended the state of emergency and began a
phased reopening of the economy. On May 4, small businesses reopened. On May 18,
cafés, medium-sized street stores, some museums, nurseries and the last two years of the
secondary school reopened. The use of masks and social distancing became mandatory in
public closed spaces.
Table 3 displays case-fatality rates (the ratio of COVID-19 deaths to people infected)
by age cohort for Portugal. For comparison, we also include data for South Korea which
was amongst the first countries to administer a large number of random tests.4 Because
many infected people are asymptomatic, random tests are key to estimating the number
of infected people in the population (the denominator of the case-fatality rate).
Three key results emerge from Table 3. First, people in the age group 20 to 49 all have
low case fatality rates. For this reason, we group these people in the same age cohort in
our empirical work. Second, case fatality rates rise non-linearly with age for people older
than 50. Third, while not identical, the data from Portugal and South Korea have similar
implications for the impact of age on case fatality rates.
Figure 2 depicts the average logarithm of public servants’ monthly consumption expen-
ditures in January, February, March, April, and May of 2018, 2019 and 2020. Because of
the large sample size, the 95 percent confidence intervals are indistinguishable from the
displayed point estimates. Figures 3 is the analogue of Figure 2 for high- and low-contact
consumption goods and services.
Three features emerge from Figures 2 and 3. First, there is a clear seasonal pattern
that is similar in 2018 and 2019. Second, there is growth in per capita spending prior to the
COVID-19 shock. Our econometric procedure takes both of these features into account in
4By August 3, 2020 the number of tests per confirmed cases is 253 in South Korea (South Korean
Center for Disease Control and Prevention). In Portugal, this number is 64 (Statistics Portugal).
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creating a counterfactual for what spending would have been in 2020 absent the COVID-
19 shock. Third, there is a pronounced drop in consumption during the epidemic months.
This drop for high-contact goods is much larger than for low-contact goods.
3.2 Age and the impact of COVID-19 on consumer expenditures
Our empirical specification focuses on the differential response of consumption by peo-




Λy1{Y eart = y}+
May∑
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λm1{Montht = m}+ θi + Ψit+
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m=Mar





δmgAftert × 1{Montht = m} × 1{AgeGroupi = g}+ εit
(1)
Subscripts i and t denote person i and calendar month t, respectively. Aftert is a dummy
variable equal to one in epidemic months and zero otherwise. The coefficients Λy measure
trend growth, common across people, in year-y consumption expenditures. The coefficients
λm control for seasonality in consumption for the months included in the sample (January
through May). The vector Ψit includes interaction terms that allow seasonal effects to vary
with individual characteristics (age, income bracket, gender, education and occupation).
The coefficients θi denote time-invariant individual fixed effects. The variable εit is the
idiosyncratic error term. The coefficients ∆m capture the change in spending of people in
the reference group (aged 20-49) during epidemic month m. The coefficient δgm measures
the additional change in spending for age group g in epidemic month m. The focus of our
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analysis is on the differential response of consumption by people with different ages.5 We
estimate equation 1 using a fixed effects (FE) estimator.6 We cluster standard errors by
person, as suggested in Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004).
As long as the inflation rate for the consumption baskets of different age cohorts is the
same, any inflation effects cancel out from the nominal differential response and we are left
with the real differential response.
Figure 4 displays the results obtained from estimating equation 1 (see column 6 of table
4 for parameter estimates). The bars around the point estimates represent 95 percent
confidence intervals. Our key findings are that all consumers reduced their expenditures
during the epidemic months. But older people cut their expenditures by much more than
younger people. The non-linear effect of age on consumer expenditures mirrors the non-
linear dependency of case-fatality rates on age.
In March, when the number of cases was still low, people with ages 20-49 and those in
their 50s, 60s and 70s cut their expenditures by 9.4, 11.0, 14.4 and 21.4 percent, respectively.
In April, when the number of cases peaked, people with ages 20-49 and those in their 50s,
60s and 70s cut their expenditures by 29.1, 31.2, 41.1 and 50.9 percent. In May, as the
number of cases fell, people with ages 20-49 and those in their 50s, 60s and 70s cut their
expenditures by 19.2, 19.1, 26.0 and 32.8 percent. In all three months, the differences
between the expenditure cuts of consumers older than 60 and those younger than 49 are
statistically significant at a 0.1 percent level (see column 6 of table 4).
5We keep age groups constant based on a persons’ age in the year 2020
6Because of our large ample size, we estimate the FE models using the method of alternating projections
implemented in R by Gaure (2013) and in STATA by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010) and Correia (2016).
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3.3 Expenditures on high- and low-contact goods and services
A natural question is whether the containment measures imposed by the government
explain the differential sensitivity of consumption expenditures by age. The answer would
be yes to the extent that those measures affect consumption goods predominantly consumed
by older people.
Imagine that containment was the only driver of the change in consumption expendi-
tures on high-contact goods during the epidemic months. Then, the percentage decline
in high-contact consumption expenditures should be the same for people of different ages.
Suppose that, in reality, older people cut their expenditures on high-contact goods by more
than younger people. Then, we would infer that age-dependency in consumption patterns
was primarily driven by the risk of infection.
Motivated by these considerations, we analyze how consumption expenditures on high-
and low-contact goods and services change as a function of people’s age. Some consumers
have zero expenditures on high-contact goods in some of the epidemic months. In addition,
the distribution of expenditures features overdispersion, i.e. the conditional variance is
larger than the conditional mean. For these reasons, we adopt a negative-binomial version
of regression model 1 with fixed effects (see Allison and Waterman (2002) and Guimaraes
(2008)) in which the dependent variables are the individual expenditures on high- and
low-contact goods and services.7
Our key results are displayed in Figure 5 and reported in Table 5. This figure shows
that older cohorts cut their expenditures on high-contact goods and services by much more
than younger cohorts in all epidemic months. The differences between the expenditure
cuts of consumers older than 60 and those younger than 49 are statistically significant at
7We estimate our model using the fixest R routine discussed in Bergé et al. (2018). This routine is
efficient and handles large samples in a reasonable amount of time.
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a 0.1 percent level.
For example, when infections peaked in April, consumers in their 70s cut their expendi-
tures by 61.8 and 28.4 on high- and low contact good, respectively. The corresponding cut
in expenditures for people younger than 49 is 26.0 and 19.2, respectively. Older cohorts cut
their expenditures more aggressively than younger cohorts in all of the epidemic months.
These cuts are particularly pronounced in April.
Overall, the results in Table 5 support the view that age-dependency in consumption
patterns during the epidemic months was driven by the risk of infection.
3.4 The response of people with different income
The economic model discussed below implies that, in order to reduce the risk of in-
fections, high-income people cut their expenditures by more than low-income people. The
reason, according to the logic of the model discussed in Section 4, is that the rich have
more to lose from becoming infected than the poor. Since older people might have higher
income than younger people, our results might conflate the effect of age per se with the
effect of income.
Figure 6 reports the results of estimating equation 1 for separate income groups. This
procedure allows for separate time trends in the expenditures of each income group. Two
key results emerge from figure 6. First, for people in every income group, on average over
the epidemic months, those older than 60 cut expenditures by more than those younger
than 49. For all income groups, the contrast between between younger and older people
is largest in April. For example, for people in the medium income group, those in the
60-69 and 70-79 age cohorts cut their expenditures, relative to people younger than 49, by
9.0, and 19.1 percent, respectively. Second, conditional on people’s age, the higher is their
income, the larger is the decline in their consumption expenditures. For example, people
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in the low-, medium- and high-income group who are between 60 and 69 years old cut their
expenditures, by 5.7, 9.0, and 10.9 percent more than people younger than 49.
The finding that expenditure cuts are an increasing function of income complements
the evidence in Chetty et al. (2020) and Carvalho et al. (2020). Unlike these authors, we
observe people’s income, so we do not have to rely on home-address ZIP codes to proxy
for that income.
3.5 The effect of comorbidity
People with underlying health conditions such as heart problems, cancer, obesity, and
type-2 diabetes are at greater risk of dying from COVID-19.8 A natural question is whether
people with comorbidities react to that risk by reducing consumption more than people
who do not have comorbidities.
We do not have the health history of people in our sample. But we do have data on how
much people spend on pharmaceutical-drugs. So, we use those expenditures as a proxy
for comorbidities. We split the sample into two. The comorbidity sample includes people
whose expenditures on pharmaceutical drugs is in the top decile of the 2018 distribution
of these expenditures for the person’s age group. The non-comorbidity sample, contains
the remaining people.
Our key result is displayed in Figure 7 and reported in Table 7. People with comor-
bidities cut their consumption by more than people without comorbidities. For example in
April, at the peak of the infection, people younger than 49 with no comorbidities cut their
consumption by 30 percent. In contrast, people younger than 49 who have comorbidities
dropped their consumption expenditures by 37.4 percent.
We find no statistically significant interaction between age and comorbidity: the impact
8See the Center for Disease Control (https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/
need-extra-precautions/evidence-table.html) for a thorough review of these comorbidities.
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of comorbidity is the same for young and old people.
Interestingly, even after controlling for comorbidity, age continues to be an important
driver of consumption behavior. On average, during the epidemic months, people younger
than 49 with no comorbidities cut their expenditures by 19.6 percent. People with no
comorbidities who are in their 50s, 60s and 70s cut consumption expenditures on average
during the epidemic months by an additional 0.5, 6.6 and 13.3 percent, respectively.
Taken together, these results provide additional support for the view that people’s
consumption decisions respond to the risk of dying from COVID-19.
3.6 Robustness
In the appendix, we report the results of four robustness checks. First, in our benchmark
specification we assume the seasonal effects for January through May 2020 are the same
as the common seasonal effects in 2018 and 2019. We provide evidence of the empirical
plausibility of this assumption.
Second, we re-do our benchmark analysis allowing for different year-on-year expenditure
trends for each age cohort. We find a similar pattern for the impact of age on the response
of expenditures to the COVID-19 shock.
Third, we provide estimates for how different age groups changed their overall consump-
tion expenditures and spending on high-contact and low-contact sectors of the economy
using an alternative to the negative-binomial specification. This alternative is the Poisson
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation with fixed effects proposed by Silva and Tenreyro
(2011). We find that our results are robust to this alternative.
Fourth, we re-do our main empirical analysis for retirees as opposed to public servants.
Retirees are another group of people whose income is likely to have remained relatively
stable during the epidemic. Our results are similar to those that we obtain for public
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servants.
4 A model of risk-taking behavior
We focus our model-based analysis on two questions. First, are people’s consumption
decisions consistent with a standard model of risk-taking behavior? Second, what fraction
of the drop in consumption was due to people’s risk-avoidance behavior as opposed to the
containment measures imposed by the government? To answer these questions, we use a
partial-equilibrium approach which allows us to confront people of different ages and health
status with real wages, real interest rates, and probabilities of infection that mimic those
observed in the data using a minimal set of assumptions.
We divide the population into two groups: old and young. To simplify, we assume that
young people become old with a constant probability per period. This stochastic-aging
assumption makes the model more tractable because it allows us to consider only two age
groups. With deterministic aging, we would need to keep track of all the different age
groups between ages 20 and 80.
As in Kermack and McKendrick (1927)’s SIR model, people are in one of four possible
health states: susceptible (those with no immunity against the virus), infected, recovered
(those who recovered from the infection and have acquired immunity against the virus),
and deceased. The critical difference between old and young people is the risk of dying
from COVID-19 or from other causes.
We assume that people’s utility has the recursive form proposed by Kreps and Porteus
(1978), Weil (1989), and Epstein and Zin (1991). A virtue of this preference specification is
that it separates the coefficient of relative risk aversion from the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. Córdoba and Ripoll (2017) make a cogent case for the use of this class of pref-
erences when studying mortality risk. To simplify the notation, we omit time subscripts.
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The symbols x and x′ denote xt and xt+1, respectively. Each time period represents a
week.
Since our empirical work relies on data for public servants, we assume that people’s
labor-supply decisions are exogenous and that the real wage rate is constant. We normalize
the number of hours worked to one. Each person faces the budget constraint
b′a = w + (1 + r)ba − (1 + µ)cha,
where cha is the consumption of a person of age a and health status h, w is the real wage
rate, and ba is the amount invested in an asset that yields a real interest rate r by a person
in age group a. As in Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt (2020), we model the containment
measures imposed by the government as a Pigouvian tax rate on consumption denoted by
µ.
The probability that a person in age group a becomes infected at time t, τa, is given
by the transmission function:
τa = π1c
h
aI + π2I, (2)
where I is the number of infected people in the population at time t. The terms π1c
h
aI
and π2I represent the probability of becoming infected through consumption- and non-
consumption related activities, respectively. As in Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt
(2020), this function embodies the assumption that people meet randomly in consumption-
and non-consumption-related activities and that susceptible people can reduce their infec-
tion probability by cutting their consumption.
We assume that utility takes the constant-elasticity form of the Kreps and Porteus
(1978) recursive preferences considered by Weil (1989) and Epstein and Zin (1991). The
lifetime utility of a person with age a and health status h is
14
Uha = z +






Here, z is a constant that influences the value of life (see Hall and Jones (2007)), β is the
discount factor, α is the coefficient of relative risk aversion for static gambles and ρ is the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with respect to deterministic income
changes. The case of ρ = α corresponds to the standard time-separable expected discounted
utility. The expectations operator E, takes into account all the stochastic elements of the
environment, including the possibility of death.
Below, we describe the value functions of different people. We denote by πad the
probability that a person of age a dies after becoming infected. The value functions of
susceptible people have two state variables: their asset balance and the total number
of infected people in the economy. The latter is relevant because it affects the risk of
susceptible people becoming infected (see equation (2)). The value functions of susceptible
and recovered people depend only on their asset balance.
The value function of a young susceptible person, U sy (b, I), is






















where δy is the probability of dying from non-viral causes. Recall that v is the probability
of a young person becoming old. U iy and U
i
o are the value functions of a young and old
infected person, respectively.
The function B(b′) represents the utility from leaving a bequest b′ upon death. We
assume that this function takes the form:
B(b′) = θ0 + θ1(b
′)1−ρ,
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where θ0 > 0 and θ1 > 0. The presence of a bequest motive allows the model to be
consistent with three empirical observations. First, many people die with large amounts of
assets (see e.g. Huggett (1996) and De Nardi and Yang (2014)). Second, the consumption
expenditures of older people are lower than those of younger people. The latter pattern
obtains in the model because, as people get older, bequests receive a higher weight in the
utility function relative to consumption. Third, bequests are a superior good. The latter
observation is consistent with the model when θ0 > 0.
With probability 1− δy − v, a young susceptible person survives without aging. With
probability τy, this person remains young but becomes infected. With probability 1 − τy,
the person remains young and susceptible. A young person ages with probability v. With
probability τy, this person becomes old and infected. With probability 1− τy, the person
remains susceptible but becomes old.
The value function of an old, susceptible person, U so (b, I), is












where δ0 is the probability of dying from non-viral causes. With probability (1−τo)(1−δo),
this person survives and does not get infected, remaining a susceptible old person. With
probability τo(1 − δo), the person survives but gets infected, becoming an infected old
person.
The value function of a young, infected person, U iy(b), is




















+ [δy + πyd(1− δy)]B(b′)1−α](1−ρ)/(1−α)}1/(1−ρ).
A young, infected person survives without aging with probability 1−δy−v. With probabil-
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ity 1−πyr−πyd, the person remains young and infected. With probability πyr, the person
remains young and recovers. With probability πyd, the person remains young but dies from
the infection. With probability 1− τy, the person remains young and susceptible. A young
person ages with probability v. With probability (1− πyr − πyd), the person becomes old
but remains infected. With probability πyr, the person becomes old and recovers. With
probability πyd the person becomes old and dies from the infection.
The value function of an old infected person, U io(b), is










+ [δo + πod(1− δo)]B(b′)1−α](1−ρ)/(1−α)}1/(1−ρ).
With probability (1−πor−πod)(1−δo), this person survives but does not recover, remaining
an old infected person. With probability πor(1 − δo), the person survives and recovers.
This person dies with probability δo and (1−δ0)πor from non-viral causes and viral causes,
respectively.
The value function of a young recovered person, U ry (b), is












This person is immune from the virus but still faces two sources of uncertainty: aging with
probability v and dying from non-viral causes with probability δy.
The value function of an old recovered person, U ro (b), is









We now discuss the parameter values used to calibrate the model. We set the annual
real interest rate, r, to 1 percent which corresponds roughly to the realized real yield
on 10-year Portuguese government bonds over the period March to May, 2020. We use
the life-expectancy tables produced by Statistics Portugal to calibrate non-COVID-related
mortality rates for young and old people. Consistent with Portuguese demographic data,
we assume that the fraction of the population between 20 and 59 years old is equal to 70
percent of the population between 20 and 79 years old. We set the probability of aging so
that the implied average age difference between old and young people is the same as in the
data (28 years).
We set the coefficient of relative risk aversion (α) to 2 and the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution (1/ρ) to 1.5. These parameter values are consistent with those used
by Albuquerque et al. (2016) to account for the equity premium and other properties of
financial-markets data. This type of data is relevant to our analysis because it reflects
people’s attitudes towards risk. The weekly discount factor, β, is set equal to 0.971/52
which is consistent with the values used in the literature on dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium models (see, e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005)).
The level parameter in the utility function (z) and the two parameters that control
the utility of bequests (θ0 and θ2) are chosen so that the model is consistent with three
features of the Portuguese data. First, the ratio of young to old people’s consumption is
roughly 1.2. Second, the average savings rate is 6.7 percent. Third, the value of life is
about 900 thousand euros, which is consistent with the value used in cost-benefit analyses
of Portuguese public works (see, e.g. Ernst and Young (2015)).
As in Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Trabandt (2020), we choose the parameters of the
transmission function (see equation (2)) to be consistent with the so-called Merkel scenario.
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According to this scenario, 60 percent of the population would be eventually exposed to
the virus if consumption remains constant at pre-epidemic levels.9 Our parameter values
are consistent with Ferguson et al. (2006)’s finding that 1/3 of airborne infections come
from economic interactions and 2/3 from non-economic interactions. As in Atkeson (2020),
we assume that it takes 18 days to either die or recover from an infections. Consistent with
the case-mortality rates for Portugal reported in Table 1 of the appendix, we assume that
the case fatality rates are 0.5 percent for those younger than 60 and 3 percent for those
older than 60.
In our sample, the average after-tax income of people younger and older than 60 in
2018 is very similar (18,900 and 19,400 euros respectively). To simplify, we assume that
both groups earn 19,000 euros a year.
We described the timeline of containment measures implemented by the Portuguese
government in section 3.1. According to INE (2020), the percentage of firms that remained
open, even if only partially, is 83, 91 and 96 percent in April, May, and June, respectively.
These percentages are similar for both small and large firms, so they are likely to be a good
measure of the impact of containment measures on the supply of goods and services. Ac-
cordingly, we use the share of businesses that closed during the lockdown as an admittedly
noisy proxy for the containment rate.
4.2 Estimating COVID-19 deaths and cases for Portugal
People in the model must compute the probability of getting infected at each point in
time. Those probabilities depend on the number of infected people. In solving the model,
we input the time series for the number of infected people from the data.
There is considerable measurement error in official measures of total infections and
9This scenario was outlined by Angela Merkel in her March 11, 2020 speech, see “Merkel Gives Germans
a Hard Truth About the Corona Virus”, New York Times, March 11, 2020.
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deaths due to COVID-19. For this reason, we estimate total deaths due to COVID-19 and
use an estimate of the case-fatality rate to back out the time series for total infections.
The procedure that we use is as follows. First, we estimate the total number of weekly
deaths that would have occurred without COVID-19. We subtract these estimates from
actual weekly deaths to obtain excess deaths. Since congestion of the health care system
was not an important factor in Portugal, we attribute these excess deaths to the direct
impact of COVID-19. Second, we assume that infections result in deaths or recovery 18
days later and that the case-fatality rate is 0.5 percent. To eliminate high-frequency noise,
we smooth the resulting time series with a monthly moving average. We use the resulting
time series for infected people as a state variable in people’s optimization problems.
Our time-series model for deaths in the absence of COVID-19 is the Bayesian model
proposed by Scott and Varian (2014); Brodersen et al. (2015) and implemented in the
CausalImpact R package developed at Google Brodersen et al. (2015). This model has a
state equation that relates the observed data to a vector of latent variables and a transition
equation that describes how the latent state evolves through time. We collected data from
January 2014 to August 2020 from the Portuguese real-time death reporting system DGS
(n.d.). We aggregate daily reported deaths to construct weekly time series of death counts
for people younger and older than 60.
We estimated the model using data from April 2014 to May 2019. Figure 8 plots
historical deaths by week of the year. Zero denotes the first week of the year. The dashed
vertical grey line marks the first week of March. The dashed vertical black line marks the
week that corresponds to the beginning of Portugal’s lockdown period in 2020. Figure 9
plots actual deaths from April 2019 to August 2020 (blue line) and predicted deaths absent
COVID-19 (orange line). Our estimate of the COVID-19-related deaths is the difference
between the blue and the orange lines in March, April and May, 2020.
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5 Comparing empirical estimates with model implications
To compare the model’s implications with the data, we estimate a version of the bench-
mark regression with only two groups, younger and older than 60. Our estimates, reported
in Appendix A.4, imply that people younger than 60 cut consumption expenditures by
10.4, 30.4, and 19.1 percent in March, April and May, respectively. People older than 60
cut expenditures by 17.5, 45.3, and 28.9 percent in March, April and May, respectively.
Turning to the model, Panel A of figure 10 shows the optimal consumption decisions
during the epidemic months for people with different asset levels. Time matters for two
reasons: both the probability of becoming infected and containment rates vary over time.
The right- and left-hand figure pertains to old and young consumers, respectively. The
model does well at accounting for our empirical findings. First, the old reduce their con-
sumption by more than the young. The reason is that the risk of dying from an infection
is much larger for an older person. Second, richer consumers cut their consumption by
more than poorer consumers. The reason is that richer people have more to loose in terms
of lifetime utility. This effect is much more important for old consumers because their
probability of dying from infection is much larger.
According to the Survey of Household Financial Conditions (Costa and Farinha, 2012),
the average net wealth for Portuguese households over the period 2013-2017 is about 150
thousand euros. Based on an average of two adults per household, per capita net wealth is
75 thousand euros. We report the model’s predictions for people with this level of assets.
In the model, consumption of the young falls by 13, 30 and 18 percent in March,
April and May, respectively. Our data-based estimates of the corresponding fall in the
consumption of the young are 10 percent, 30 percent, and 19 percent. In the model,
consumption of the old falls by 29, 42 and 27 percent in March, April and May, respectively.
Our data-based estimates of the corresponding consumption falls are 17 percent, 45 percent,
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and 29 percent.
Our model does quite well at accounting for the behavior of young people during all of
the epidemic months and the behavior of old in April and May. The model overpredicts
the consumption response of old people in March. This property could reflect the slow
diffusion of information about the fatality risk associated with COVID-19 in the beginning
of the epidemic.
An important question is: what was the impact on consumption of containment mea-
sures versus people’s risk aversion to becoming infected? A natural way to answer this
question is to re-solve the model setting containment rates to zero. But, to do this one
would have to construct the counterfactual path for aggregate infections that would ob-
tain in the absence of containment. This counterfactual is hard to construct without a
general equilibrium model. But building such a model would require a host of additional
assumptions.
We adopt the following alternative strategy: compute the counterfactual fall in expen-
ditures that would have taken place if the government had imposed containment measures
but there were no infections. The difference between the consumption policy functions with
and without containment allows us to estimate the impact of containment per se. This es-
timate relies on the assumption that, to a first order, the observed behavior of expenditures
is the sum of people’s response to containment and the risk of becoming infected.
Panel B of figure 10 shows how the consumption decision rules for old and young people
vary over time in the absence of infections for different asset levels. Time is relevant because
containment rates vary over time. Panel B shows that the containment measures in isolation
have a similar impact on the consumption of young and old. So, the pronounced difference
in the expenditures of young and old displayed in Panel A of Figure 10 reflects mostly
people’s response to their risk of dying from COVID-19. This conclusion is consistent
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with the findings of Villas-Boas et al. (2020) and Goolsbee and Syverson (2020) based on
mobility data. It is also consistent with the conclusions in Chetty et al. (2020).
The difference between the decision rules displayed in panel A and B of figure 10 gives
us the reduction in spending that would have obtained in the absence of containment. For
example, these panels imply that the consumption of young and old people would have
dropped in April by 9.2 and 21.2 percent, respectively, had there been no containment. So
while containment had some effect, much of the difference in the behavior of young and
old people reflects their response to the risks of becoming infected.
In sum, our empirical findings are broadly consistent with a standard model of risk-
taking behavior. The key prediction of the model is that people reduce their consumption
to lower the probability of getting infected, even in the absence of containment. Older
people cut their consumption by more than younger people because their risk of dying
from COVID-19 is higher.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies how people respond to low probability events that have large conse-
quences. We find strong evidence that people react to such risks in a way that is consistent
with a canonical model of risk taking.
Low-probability events play an important role in many economic models and are the
focus of many policy debates on topics such as global warming and terrorism. How to
model people’s behavior with respect to such events remains a controversial issue. After
all, it is hard to learn about the probability of rare events. Our empirical results suggest
that, at least for events that receive a great deal of media attention, people respond in a





















































Figure 1: COVID-19 cases and deaths reported by the Portuguese Health Authority (Au-
gust 5, 2020).






















Figure 2: Average of the logarithm of public servants’ monthly expenditures
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Figure 3: Average of the logarithm of public servants’ monthly expenditures on high- and





    [70;79]
    [60;69]
    [20;49]


























    [70;79]
    [60;69]
    [50;59]


























    [70;79]
    [60;69]
    [50;59]























Figure 5: Changes in expenditures of public servants during the epidemic relative to a
counterfactual without COVID-19. Panel (A) and (B) pertain to high- and low-contact
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Figure 6: Changes in expenditures of public servants in different income groups during the
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Figure 7: Changes in the expenditures of public servants during the epidemic relative to a
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Time Series ● ●Actual Death Projected Death
Figure 9: Actual deaths and predicted deaths absent COVID-19 in Portugal from April
2019 to May 2020
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Figure 10: Consumption decision rules for old and young implied by economic model.
Panel A shows the combined effect of the epidemic and containment measures. Panel B
shows the effect of containment measures only.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics, January 2018 - May 2020
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Pctl(25) Median Pctl(75)
All People
Expense p. month (All) 618.5 2,125.3 120.8 283.3 568.1
Expense p. month (High Contact) 268.5 984.3 19.6 101.6 280.5
Expense p. month (Low Contact) 282.4 1,295.7 43.4 120.4 266.4
Expense p. month (Pharmacy) 18.2 35.9 0.0 4.8 24.3
Public Servants
Expense p. month (All) 673.9 1,639.4 211.4 417.7 731.8
Expense p. month (High Contact) 307.3 554.5 64.0 191.9 396.4
Expense p. month (Low Contact) 297.1 1,046.4 68.7 158.9 315.7
Expense p. month (Pharmacy) 26.1 43.4 0.0 11.8 36.1
Retirees
Expense p. month (All) 428.4 1,659.5 78.8 187.5 411.0
Expense p. month (High Contact) 204.0 834.7 14.8 70.5 214.1
Expense p. month (Low Contact) 189.8 974.3 26.1 81.4 176.0
Expense p. month (Pharmacy) 24.6 42.4 0.0 12.5 35.0
Note: Pctl() denotes percentile and St. Dev. the standard deviation
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Table 2: Distribution of monthly expenses by age and income, January 2018 - May 2020
Group N Mean St. Dev Pctl(25) Median. Pctl(75)
All People
Age [20;49] 190,0336 632.9 2,015.0 135.8 311.3 589.7
Age [50;59] 85,305 668.1 2,365.8 122.2 298.3 611.2
Age [60;69] 74,390 605.5 2,220.6 97.6 246.9 539.1
Age [70;79] 71,605 425.7 1,800.3 65.2 169.6 389.0
Income [0;7,091] 114,295 286.7 1071.9 43.8 125.7 287.3
Income ]7,091;20,261] 217,381 471.4 1405.5 123.1 265.4 489.0
Income ]20,261;40,522] 64,593 894.3 2061.3 310.9 549.6 907.4
Income ]40,522;80,640] 19,377 1549.3 3145.0 461.9 831.7 1486.4
Income ≥80,640 5,691 5227.0 10802.9 683.1 1588.7 5439.4
Public Servants
Age [20;49] 10,007 769.8 1,904.5 288.2 501.3 798.0
Age [50;59] 15,367 716.5 1,610.8 253.0 473.6 789.8
Age [60;69] 18,837 660.3 1,612.7 193.8 393.6 712.9
Age [70;79] 14,387 550.1 1,457.7 143.3 308.3 597.0
Income [0;7,091] 1,620 250.2 861.6 52.1 125.7 263.3
Income ]7,091;20,261] 24,250 428.0 1,106.0 139.0 275.1 483.1
Income ]20,261;40,522] 25,651 757.0 1,659.8 299.8 520.4 824.6
Income ]40,522;80,640] 6,194 1,124.6 2,272.8 433.9 746.1 1,196.5
Income ≥80,640 883 2,148.9 4,443.7 625.8 1,122.7 1,963.2
Retirees
Age [20;49] 935 229.5 951.2 16.9 78.0 206.2
Age [50;59] 3,114 283.2 1,119.1 31.7 108.2 277.6
Age [60;69] 26,920 420.1 1,434.7 76.0 195.7 430.1
Age [70;79] 63,467 411.8 1,722.5 65.8 170.0 386.2
Income [0;7,091] 37,998 159.7 580.3 26.9 78.9 171.0
Income ]7,091;20,261] 38,328 353.2 940.0 105.1 214.0 396.7
Income ]20,261;40,522] 13,925 722.5 1,674.3 245.5 459.0 783.1
Income ]40,522;80,640] 3,351 1,299.3 2,538.1 417.1 760.4 1,345.9
Income ≥80,640 834 5,423.6 11,681.5 689.8 1,652.5 5,527.1
Note: Pctl() denotes percentile and St. Dev. the standard deviation
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Table 3: Case-fatality Rates, COVID-19
Age Group Infected Deceased Case Fata-
lity Rate
Portugal
[0; 19] 4,034 0 0.0%
[20; 49] 24,230 24 0.1%
[50; 59] 7,628 55 0.7%
[60; 69] 5,053 152 3.0%
[70; 79] 3,505 332 9.5%
≥ 80 5,781 1,155 20.0%
South Korea
[0; 19] 890 0 0.0%
[20; 49] 6,495 5 0.1%
[50; 59] 2,275 15 0.7%
[60; 69] 1,653 41 2.5%
[70; 79] 846 82 9.7%
≥ 80 556 139 25.0%
Source: Data for Portugal collected from the Portuguese Health
Authority on July 28, 2020. Data for South Korea col-
lected from the South Korean CDC on June 28, 2020.
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Table 4: Impact of age on consumption expenditures
Dependent variable:
log(Expensesit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aftert (γ0) −0.259∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Aftert × 1{Agei = [50; 59]}(γ[50;59]) −0.013+ −0.012
(0.007) (0.008)
Aftert × 1{Agei = [60; 69]}(γ[60;69]) −0.080∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Aftert × 1{Agei = [70; 79]}(γ[70;79]) −0.151∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar}(∆Mar) −0.144∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.008)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr}(∆Apr) −0.388∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May}(∆May) −0.247∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]}(δMar,[50;59]) −0.010 −0.016
(0.009) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]}(δMar,[60;69]) −0.043∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]}(δMar,[70;79]) −0.103∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]}(δApr,[50;59]) −0.023∗ −0.021+
(0.010) (0.011)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]}(δApr,[60;69]) −0.123∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]}(δApr,[70;79]) −0.218∗∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]}(δMay,[50;59]) −0.005 0.001
(0.009) (0.011)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]}(δMay,[60;69]) −0.074∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]}(δMay,[70;79]) −0.132∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)
1{Montht = Feb}(λFeb) −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018)
1{Montht = Mar}(λMar) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.027 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018)
1{Montht = Apr}(λApr) −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.002 −0.002 0.018
(0.002) (0.002) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019)
1{Montht = May}(λMay) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.031+ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.031+
(0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018)
1{Y eart = 2019}(Λ2019) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1{Y eart = 2020}(Λ2020) 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Person Fixed Effects (θi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Group × Month FE (Ψit) No No Yes No No Yes
Income Group × Month FE (Ψit) No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 869,281 869,281 869,281 869,281 869,281 869,281
Adjusted R2 0.642 0.642 0.643 0.643 0.644 0.644
Residual Std. Error 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.657 0.657 0.657
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered by person
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All High Contact Low Contact All High Contact Low Contact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aftert (γ0) −0.174∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Aftert × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (γ[50;59]) −0.016
∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Aftert × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (γ[60;69]) −0.073
∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Aftert × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (γ[70;79]) −0.138
∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} (∆Mar) −0.093∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} (∆Apr) −0.262∗∗∗ −0.260∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} (∆May) −0.168∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δMar,[50;59]) −0.016
+ 0.001 −0.031∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δMar,[60;69]) −0.044
∗∗∗ −0.021+ −0.084∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δMar,[70;79]) −0.104
∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δApr,[50;59]) −0.020
∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.017+
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δApr,[60;69]) −0.105
∗∗∗ −0.205∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δApr,[70;79]) −0.193
∗∗∗ −0.358∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δMay,[50;59]) −0.012 −0.018 −0.025
∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δMay,[60;69]) −0.076
∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δMay,[70;79]) −0.125
∗∗∗ −0.212∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
1{Montht = Feb} (λFeb) −0.069∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
1{Montht = Mar} (λMar) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
1{Montht = Apr} (λApr) −0.041∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.005+ 0.002 −0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
1{Montht = May} (λMay) 0.064∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
1{Y eart = 2019} (Λ2019) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1{Y eart = 2020} (Λ2020) 0.080∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Person FE (θi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deviance 930, 200 1, 039, 883 980, 300 930, 098 1, 039, 902 980, 281
Num. Obs. 869, 281 865, 846 863, 606 869, 281 865, 846 863, 606
Num. Groups (Person id) 58, 371 58, 125 57, 918 58371 58, 125 57, 918
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; +p < 0.1
Standard errors clustered by person in parenthesis.
36
Table 6: Impact of age on consumption expenditures by income group (equation 1).
Dependent variable:
log(Expensesit)
20, 061 ≤ ]20, 061; 40, 522] ≥ 40, 522
(1) (2) (3)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} (∆Mar) −0.054∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.032)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} (∆Apr) −0.230∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.033)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} (∆May) −0.148∗∗∗ −0.222∗∗∗ −0.241∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.032)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δMar,[50;59]) −0.004 −0.018 −0.009
(0.017) (0.013) (0.036)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δMar,[60;69]) −0.051∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.051
(0.016) (0.014) (0.035)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δMar,[70;79]) −0.107∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.037)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δApr,[50;59]) 0.015 −0.029∗ −0.046
(0.018) (0.014) (0.039)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δApr,[60;69]) −0.094∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.036)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δApr,[70;79]) −0.176∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗ −0.260∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.039)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δMay,[50;59]) 0.032+ −0.005 −0.037
(0.018) (0.014) (0.037)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δMay,[60;69]) −0.035∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.034)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δMay,[70;79]) −0.116∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗ −0.206∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.038)
1{Y eart = 2019} (Λ2019) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
1{Y eart = 2020} (Λ2020) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
1{Montht = Feb} (λFeb) −0.048∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.021)
1{Montht = Mar} (λMar) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.016∗ 0.009
(0.016) (0.008) (0.024)
1{Montht = Apr} (λApr) 0.034∗ −0.003 −0.016
(0.014) (0.009) (0.026)
1{Montht = May} (λMay) 0.081∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.012) (0.008) (0.023)
Person FE (θi) Yes Yes Yes
Age Group × Month FE (Ψit) Yes Yes Yes
Observations 382,643 381,986 104,652
Num. Groups 25,823 25,551 6,997
Adjusted R2 0.616 0.548 0.545
Residual Std. Error 0.688 0.627 0.642
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Cluster robust standard errors in ()
Standard errors clustered by person
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Comorbidityi = 0 Comorbidityi = 1
(1) (2)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} (∆Mar) −0.100∗∗∗ −0.125∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.018)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} (∆Apr) −0.300∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.020)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} (∆May) −0.196∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.021)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δMar,[50;59]) −0.009 0.018
(0.009) (0.021)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δMar,[60;69]) −0.036∗∗∗ 0.011
(0.009) (0.021)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δMar,[70;79]) −0.083∗∗∗ −0.053∗
(0.010) (0.022)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δApr,[50;59]) −0.023∗ 0.006
(0.010) (0.024)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δApr,[60;69]) −0.114∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.024)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δApr,[70;79]) −0.200∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.025)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δMay,[50;59]) 0.002 −0.010
(0.010) (0.024)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δMay,[60;69]) −0.058∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗
(0.010) (0.024)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δMay,[70;79]) −0.105∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.025)
1{Y eart = 2020} (Λ2020) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.012+
(0.003) (0.007)
1{Montht = Feb} (λFeb) −0.069∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006)
1{Montht = Mar} (λMar) 0.016∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.004) (0.008)
1{Montht = Apr} (λApr) 0.010∗∗ 0.004
(0.004) (0.008)
1{Montht = May} (λMay) 0.051∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008)
Person FE (θi) Yes Yes
Observations 493,188 85,620
Groups 49,774 8,597
Adjusted R2 0.664 0.602
Residual Std. Error 0.649 0.597
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis
Standard errors clustered by person
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A Appendix
This appendix is organized as follows. The first subsection presents the classification
of sectors into high- and low- contact. The second subsection provides evidence of the
empirical plausibility of the assumption, used in our empirical specification, that seasonal
effects for January through May 2020 are the same as the common seasonal effects in
2018 and 2019. The third subsection provides results estimated by age cohort, alternative
estimates to those obtained using the negative binomial specification, and results obtained
using data for retirees instead of public servants. The fourth subsection provides results
estimated to contrast with the economic model of consumer behavior.
A.1 Sector Classifications
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Table 8: Classification of sectors into high and low contact (Part I)
code description class
01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities Low
02 Forestry and logging Low
03 Fishing and aquaculture Low
05 Mining of coal and lignite Low
06 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas Low
07 Mining of metal ores Low
08 Other mining and quarrying Low
09 Mining support service activities Low
10 Manufacture of food products Low
11 Manufacture of beverages Low
12 Manufacture of tobacco products Low
13 Manufacture of textiles Low
14 Manufacture of wearing apparel Low
15 Manufacture of leather and related products Low
16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of
articles of straw and plaiting materials
Low
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products Low
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media Low
19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products Low
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products Low
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations Low
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastics products Low
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products Low
24 Manufacture of basic metals Low
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment Low
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products Low
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment Low
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. Low
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers Low
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment Low
31 Manufacture of furniture Low
32 Other manufacturing Low
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment Low
35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply Low
36 Water collection, treatment and supply Low
37 Sewerage Low
38 Waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery Low
39 Remediation activities and other waste management services Low
41 Construction of buildings Low
42 Civil engineering Low
43 Specialized construction activities Low
45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles Medium
46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles High
47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles High
49 Land transport and transport via pipelines Low
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Table 9: Classification of sectors into high and low contact (Part II)
code description class
50 Water transport High
51 Air transport High
52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation Low
53 Postal and courier activities Low
55 Accommodation High
56 Food and beverage service activities High
58 Publishing activities Low
59 Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and music
publishing activities
Low
60 Programming and broadcasting activities Low
61 Telecommunications Low
62 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities Low
63 Information service activities Low
64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding Low
65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security Low
66 Activities auxiliary to financial service and insurance activities Low
68 Real estate activities Low
69 Legal and accounting activities Low
70 Activities of head offices; management consultancy activities Low
71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis Low
72 Scientific research and development Low
73 Advertising and market research Low
74 Other professional, scientific and technical activities Low
75 Veterinary activities Low
77 Rental and leasing activities Low
78 Employment activities Low
79 Travel agency, tour operator, reservation service and related activities Low
80 Security and investigation activities Low
81 Services to buildings and landscape activities Low
82 Office administrative, office support and other business support activities Low
84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security Low
85 Education High
86 Human health activities High
87 Residential care activities Medium
88 Social work activities without accommodation Medium
90 Creative, arts and entertainment activities High
91 Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural activities Medium
92 Gambling and betting activities Low
93 Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities High
94 Activities of membership organizations High
95 Repair of computers and personal and household goods Low
96 Other personal service activities Low
97 Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel Low
98 Undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of private households for own use Low
99 Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies Low
46
A.2 Seasonality effects
Equation 1 assumes that, in the absence of the epidemic, the seasonal effects for the
January through May 2020 (λm) are the same as the common seasonal effects in 2018 and
2019. To assess the empirical plausibility of this assumption, we estimated the following
specification using data from January 2018 through May 2020:






φm1{Montht = m} × 1{Y eart = 2019}+ θi + εit
(3)
The φm coefficients measure the difference between seasonal effects in 2019 and 2018.
Under the null hypothesis that these effects are identical in both years, all φm coefficients
should be zero. Table 10 presents the regression coefficients.
Figure 11 displays our estimates of φm along with 95 percent confidence intervals.
Regardless of which age we focus on, most estimates of φm = 0 are not statistically different
from zero at a 95 percent confidence level. For the age groups corresponding to panels
(2), (3), and (4), we cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that all of the φms are zero.
We do reject this null hypothesis for the overall sample that includes all ages. However,
the estimates of φm are small, especially when compared to the changes in consumption
expenditures that occur after the COVID-19 shock. For example, in the first column of
table 10 for May average log expenditures fell by 21 percent, while the value of φm for that
month is -0.89 percent.
Throughout, we use logarithmic percentage changes in discussing our empirical results.
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All Age[20;49] Age[50;59] Age[60;69] Age[70;79]













Figure 11: Seasonality effects for different age groups
A.3 Robustness of Empirical Results
In this subsection, we report the results of several robustness checks. First, we esti-
mate separate versions of equation 1 for each age cohort. We consider versions with total
expenditures (Table 11), expenditures on high- and low-contact goods (Table 12) as well
as a version with co-morbidity (Table 13). This split-sample by age approach allows each
cohort to have different time trends and seasonality in the relevant measure of consumption
expenditures. We find a similar pattern for the impact of age on the response of expen-
ditures to the COVID-19 shock. Our results regarding age, high- and low-contact, and
comorbidity are robust to the split-sample approach.
Second, we provide estimates for how different age groups changed their overall con-
sumption expenditures and spending on high-contact and low-contact sectors of the econ-
omy using an alternative to the negative binomial specification. This alternative is the
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation with fixed effects proposed by Silva and
Tenreyro (2011). We report the results in Table 14 which are consistent with those obtained
using the negative binomial specification.
Third, we re-do our main empirical analysis for retirees as opposed to public servants.
Our results are similar to those we obtain for public servants. Table 15 is the analogue of
Table 4. We see that the consumption expenditures of older retirees fall much more than
48
those of younger retirees. In addition, spending declines are particularly pronounced in
April, the peak month of the epidemic.
Table 10: Trends and seasonal effects in 2018 and 2019
Dependent variable:
log(Expensesit)
All [20;49] [50;59] [60;69] [70;79]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1{Y eart = 2019} (Λ2019) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Feb (λFeb) −0.080∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Mar (λMar) 0.031
∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Apr (λApr) −0.013∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.003 −0.026∗∗∗ −0.013
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
May (λMay) 0.054
∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
1{Y eart = 2019} × Feb (φFeb) −0.001 −0.013 −0.002 0.009 −0.005
(0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
1{Y eart = 2019} × Mar (φMar) −0.022∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.014 −0.017+ −0.048∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
1{Y eart = 2019} × Apr (φApr) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.019∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.009
(0.005) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
1{Y eart = 2019} × May (φMay) −0.009+ −0.004 −0.009 −0.009 −0.013
(0.005) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Constant 5.893∗∗∗ 6.086∗∗∗ 6.010∗∗∗ 5.875∗∗∗ 5.654∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
χ2 ( φFeb = 0, φMar = 0, φApr = 0, φMay = 0) 21.448 4.045 4.569 7.779 9.834
P-value 0.0003 0.400 0.334 0.100 0.043
Observations 580,576 99,591 152,596 186,674 141,715
R2 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001
Residual Std. Error 1.091 0.948 1.015 1.118 1.175
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 14: Impact of age on expenditure on high- and low- contact goods and services
(Poisson model)
Expensesit
All High Contact Low Contact All High Contact Low Contact
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Aftert (γ0) −0.178∗∗∗ −0.167∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Aftert × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (γ[50;59]) −0.055∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Aftert × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (γ[60;69]) −0.104∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Aftert × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (γ[70;79]) −0.159∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} (∆Mar) −0.040∗∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} (∆Apr) −0.299∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} (∆May) −0.215∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δMar,[50;59]) −0.096∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δMar,[60;69]) −0.116∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δMar,[70;79]) −0.187∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.255∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δApr,[50;59]) −0.035∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δApr,[60;69]) −0.106∗∗∗ −0.246∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δApr,[70;79]) −0.224∗∗∗ −0.406∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [50; 59]} (δMay,[50;59]) −0.029∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [60; 69]} (δMay,[60;69]) −0.088∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Agei = [70; 79]} (δMay,[70;79]) −0.078∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
1{Montht = Feb} (λFeb) −0.065∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1{Montht = Mar} (λMar) 0.068∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1{Montht = Apr} (λApr) −0.033∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1{Montht = May} (λMay) 0.078∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1{Y eart = 2019} (Λ2019) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
1{Y eart = 2020} (Λ2020) 0.072∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Person FE (θi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Num. Obs. 869281 865846 863606 869281 865846 863606
Num. Groups (Person id) 58371 58125 57918 58371 58125 57918
∗∗∗p < 0.001; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; +p < 0.1
Cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered by person
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Table 15: Impact of age on consumption expenditures for retirees
Dependent variable:
log(Expenseit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aftert (γ0) −0.211∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.023) (0.026)
Aftert × 1{AgeGroupi = [50; 59]} (γ[50;59]) −0.018 −0.010
(0.026) (0.029)
Aftert × 1{AgeGroupi = [60; 69]} (γ[60;69]) −0.071∗∗ −0.085∗∗
(0.024) (0.027)
Aftert × 1{AgeGroupi = [70; 79]} (γ[70;79]) −0.122∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.026)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} (∆Mar) −0.097∗∗∗ −0.008 0.004
(0.003) (0.031) (0.037)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} (∆Apr) −0.329∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.037) (0.040)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} (∆May) −0.209∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗
(0.003) (0.032) (0.037)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{AgeGroupi = [50; 59]} (δMar,[50;59]) −0.028 −0.018
(0.035) (0.042)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{AgeGroupi = [60; 69]} (δMar,[60;69]) −0.059+ −0.071+
(0.032) (0.038)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{AgeGroupi = [70; 79]} (δMar,[70;79]) −0.106∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗
(0.032) (0.038)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{AgeGroupi = [50; 59]} (δApr,[50;59]) −0.012 −0.006
(0.041) (0.044)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{AgeGroupi = [60; 69]} (δApr,[60;69]) −0.103∗∗ −0.117∗∗
(0.037) (0.040)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{AgeGroupi = [70; 79]} (δApr,[70;79]) −0.161∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.040)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{AgeGroupi = [50; 59]} (δMay,[50;59]) −0.012 −0.006
(0.036) (0.041)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{AgeGroupi = [60; 69]} (δMay,[60;69]) −0.051 −0.068+
(0.032) (0.037)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{AgeGroupi = [70; 79]} (δMay,[70;79]) −0.100∗∗ −0.113∗∗
(0.032) (0.037)
1{Montht = Feb} (λApr) −0.064∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.026) (0.002) (0.002) (0.026)
1{Montht = Mar} (λMar) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ −0.001 0.003 0.003 −0.033
(0.002) (0.002) (0.027) (0.002) (0.002) (0.028)
1{Montht = Apr} (λApr) −0.051∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.049+
(0.002) (0.002) (0.027) (0.002) (0.002) (0.027)
1{Montht = May} (λMay) 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ −0.012 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.027) (0.002) (0.002) (0.029)
1{Y eart = 2019} (Λ2019) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1{Y eart = 2020} (Λ2020) 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Person Fixed Effects (θi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Group × Month FE (Ψit) No No Yes No No Yes
Income Group × Month FE (Ψit) No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,347,407 1,347,407 1,347,407 1,347,407 1,347,407 1,347,407
Adjusted R2 0.698 0.698 0.698 0.698 0.698 0.698
Residual Std. Error 0.748 0.748 0.747 0.747 0.747 0.747
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors clustered by person
54
A.4 Model Calibration
Table 16: Impact of age on consumption expenditures for consumers older and younger
than 60 (used in economic model calibration)
Dependent variable:
log(Expenseit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aftert(γ0) −0.259∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.200∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Aftert × 1{Age ≥ 60}(γ≥60) −0.103∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar}(∆Mar) −0.144∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr}(∆Apr) −0.388∗∗∗ −0.304∗∗∗ −0.304∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May}(∆May) −0.247∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Mar} × 1{Age ≥ 60}(δMar,≥60) −0.062∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Aftert × 1{Montht = Apr} × 1{Age ≥ 60}(δApr,≥60) −0.150∗∗∗ −0.149∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007)
Aftert × 1{Montht = May} × 1{Age ≥ 60}(δMay,≥60) −0.096∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
1{Montht = Feb}(λFeb) −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018)
1{Montht = Mar}(λMar) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.032+ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.0004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)
1{Montht = Apr}(λApr) −0.044∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.016 −0.002 −0.002 0.018
(0.002) (0.002) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018)
1{Montht = May}(λMay) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.034+ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.031+
(0.003) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) (0.003) (0.018)
1{Y eart = 2019}(Λ2019) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1{Y eart = 2020}(Λ2020) 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Individual FE (θi) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE (Λy) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE (λy) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age Group x Month FE (Ψit) No No Yes No No Yes
Income Group x Month FE (Ψit) No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 869,281 869,281 869,281 869,281 869,281 869,281
Adjusted R2 0.642 0.642 0.643 0.643 0.644 0.644
Residual Std. Error 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.657 0.657 0.657
Note: + p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
Cluster robust standard errors in parenthesis
Standard errors clustered by person
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